The face-off with China at multiple points on the long Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China since May 05th has been the stuff of prime-time TV, the print media as well as social media for an entire month, as can be expected in a democracy with a largely free media and concerned public. A lot of analysis, and thought by experts, has gone into the reasons why China would open another front at this time against India in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic ravaging the entire world, its platter seemingly full with Hong Kong, WHO, the growing clamor for an inquiry into the origin of the Coronavirus, Taiwan, the South China Sea as well as trade, for what was termed as “marginal territories” by Dr Ashley Tellis in an interview on India Today TV with Rahul Kanwal recently. So far, the Government of India has not officially confirmed if there has actually been an incursion on the Indian side of the LAC or its exact extent. However, other accounts indicate that the Chinese have intruded to some extent and occupied some critical heights overlooking the new Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road, in numbers not seen hitherto in previous numerous incursions, and with artillery, armor and aircraft in support.1
As per some experts, Chinese troops are in occupation of about 40 sq km of territory on the Indian side of the LAC. 2 However, this has been disputed by other experts who claim that the initial intrusions were shallow and the Chinese forces are currently not on Indian side of the LAC, 3 except perhaps between Finger 4 and Finger 8 where the LAC claims of the two sides differ. Recent reports also indicate that both sides have moved back by a Kilometer or two to defuse the situation by “consensus”, as it is called, after the meeting at Lt General level on June 06. Regardless of the actual extent of the intrusions, which the Government of India has neither confirmed nor officially denied so far, it is obvious from the statements of the Defense Minister that there is a problem at the LAC where the Chinese have amassed in large numbers, not seen earlier. Also, if the confrontations were merely on the LAC and not inside India, it is unlikely that these would have generated so much heat and media hype as well as the kind of military and diplomatic parleys underway. Further, without any intrusions, why is it being said that India would continue to press for status quo ante as of April in the negotiations underway now? 4
It is also obvious that this is a well-planned Chinese move, approved at the highest level, for which they have been preparing for some time. These incursions or confrontations are certainly not the regular knee-jerk reaction at the tactical level to some patrolling and infrastructure building by India on its own side of the LAC. In any event, India also has a right to build such infrastructure within its own territory, to be able to defend itself, as per the principle of equal security under the agreements with China on the border issue, particularly when the Chinese have been building all-weather heavy-duty roads and modern infrastructure for troops and logistics all along the LAC and the border from West to East for years now. Since India has never been aggressive on the border with China, except in retaliation, the Chinese infrastructure is obviously to support a rapid offensive as, when and where required. The importance of the territory and infrastructure in dispute has also been highlighted by other experts like T Stobadan, particularly in the Galwan valley, which makes access to Shyok valley easier in any future conflict while making our positions in Siachen and Karakoram Range difficult. At Naku La, the attempted intrusions tend to outflank our positions across the Chumbi valley. 5 The securing of water resources of the glaciers in the Shaksgam area, illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963, could also be a bonus objective.
It needs to be noted that China generally tends to pick the time for confrontation when the opponent is pre-occupied, as the world today is with the pandemic, to extract maximum mileage from the confrontation. The incidents at Chumar in 2014 during the Kashmir floods are an example. Chinese communist party leadership is also under growing domestic pressure due to its handling of the Coronavirus, the Hong Kong issue, economic growth and trade issues. That may also be one of the reasons for China to militarily flex its muscle in the South and East China Seas as also its economic might against the other powers in the region to divert attention from domestic issues. Thus, it is all the more important to be even more alert when we have a domestic problem where most of our attention is.
In view of the overall current geo-political situation, it is also highly unlikely that territorial gains were the primary reason for the current incursions and confrontation with India. The intent seems to have been to move in and occupy unguarded territories to secure tactically advantageous positions for any future confrontation, to portray India as a weak and undependable power and, perhaps most importantly, to extract a number of strategically important concessions. These could be in terms of India’s participation in the international clamor for an independent inquiry into the origins of the Coronavirus and reparations, India’s likely actions on the chair of WHO executive board, Taiwan’s presence as an observer at the WHA meeting, an issue that has been shelved for a few months already, India’s growing closeness to the US and other regional powers, its presence, support and growing soft-power influence on other nations, particularly in the Indo- Pacific and, most importantly, on trade and economic issues with the recent scrutiny on foreign investments by neighbors, particularly Chinese, its refusal to join RCEP and attempts to wean away businesses from China. Of course, so far none of the Chinese demands are in public domain despite many military to military talks at pretty high levels along with some diplomatic parleys. However, the official Chinese state media has hinted at our growing closeness to the US as one of the reasons, which tends to thwart their practice of dealing bilaterally with all weaker powers. China seems to overlook the fact that its aggressive stand is likely to push India further in its search for friends and allies to deter China.
It also needs to be realized that having moved, in force with clearance at the highest levels, China is unlikely to totally vacate the occupied areas in a hurry without suitable concessions. China is, perhaps, also bolstered in its belief that India would not escalate the situation due to repeated statements from political, diplomatic and military leadership of India that the existing bilateral mechanisms between the two nations to resolve disputes have prevented a bullet from being fired for over five decades since Nathu La in 1967. 6 China is also bolstered by the fact that its earlier aggressions over the decades went largely unchallenged. We also seem to place an exaggerated sense of confidence in the spirit of Wuhan and the bonhomie furthered strengthened between the leaders of the two countries at Mamallapuram, as late as October 2019 despite the fact that, soon thereafter in January 2020, China was trying to raise the issue of Kashmir at the UN to question the abrogation of Article 370 and the changed status of Ladakh. The focus of China, on the other hand, has always been on raw power behind a façade of diplomacy.
From the way the Chinese have moved in this time also indicates that the planning and preparations for this large-scale move must have started around the same time in a multi-pronged strategy for containment of India. China’s likely encouragement of Nepal in its claim on Kalapani and Lipulekh areas, 7 apart from its continuing support of Pakistan, 8 may also be viewed in the context of its multi-pronged efforts in strategic containment of India.
In this respect, the lessons of history on the duplicity and unreliability of Chinese assurances should also not be forgotten. 9 Even before the ink had dried on the Panchsheel agreement of 1954, Beijing had already started moving into the desolate and unmanned Aksai Chin area of the erstwhile state of J K and started building a crucial strategic road to Xinjiang. In the humiliating war of 1962, China merely expanded and consolidated its occupation of Aksai Chin. From the beginning, it has been adept at slow and creeping occupation of territory in what even PM Nehru referred to as China’s “mobile frontiers”, 10 which has also been called as “salami slicing”, evident even in South China Sea. Even as late as 1959, Zhou Enlai had stated in a letter that the 1956 map, published by China, which depicted the eastern boundary of Ladakh with Tibet in conformity with the Indian position, that it “correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector”, 11 even while the salami slicing was in progress in this area. Old Chinese/Tibetan maps of 1893 and 1909 vintage accessed by India Today recently reconfirm Aksai Chin as apart of Ladakh. 12 A similar attempt at salami slicing appears to have been made this time, except that the Indian armed forces reacted quickly to check the incursions and force the Chinese to the negotiating table. It was, perhaps, due to this failed attempt that the Chinese Ambassador Sun Weidong made a statement, on May 27 over three weeks after the incursions and occupation, that we pose no threat to each other and that the Dragon and the Elephant must dance together. Similar statements also emanated from the Chinese foreign ministry. The point being made is that the statements of Chinese leaders exhorting peace and cooperation, after attempting a fait accompli, should not be taken at face value without verifiable action on the ground.
Without going into too many details here due to constraints of space in this article, it does need to be highlighted that in April 1960, it was decided between PM Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai that both sides would prepare an official report with evidence on the boundary issue, the intent being to resolve it amicably. Later, three leading American Scholars carried out a detailed study of the evidence in the above Officials’ Report and came to the unequivocal conclusion that “the case the Chinese presented was a shoddy piece of work, betraying–if only to those in a position to consult the sources cited—a fundamental contempt for evidence” in support of its claims and later aggression. 13 The map of JK, in existence since 1822, when Maharaja Ranjit Singh handed over the state to Gulab Singh, also substantiates India’s claim to the entire Aksai Chin, currently in illegal and forceful occupation of China, if not portions of Tibet when General Zorawar Singh almost conquered Kailash-Mansarovar but, unfortunately, died fighting close to it in 1841. If Zorawar had succeeded, our holy pilgrimage site would have been a part of JK, and thus of India, after the instrument of accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on October 26, 1947. Even China’s claim to Tawang and, later, almost the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, is negated by the fact that while it retained the occupied territories in Ladakh and Aksai Chin after the 1962 war, it withdrew largely to the McMahon line in the eastern sector thus tacitly accepting this boundary, coupled with the fact that it has settled its boundary with the other nations in this area based on this line and the watershed principle. Certainly, our claim to Kailash-Mansarover is stronger than China’s claim to Tawang.
In the current reality, the fact remains that China is an expansionist power progressively trying to occupy what it conveniently terms as “lost territories” based on its own interpretation of history. With it’s growing economic and, consequently, military might, it has started aggressively flexing its muscle in its insatiable drive towards world domination making no secret of its plans to replace the US as the dominant power by 2049. Concurrently, China continuously tries to strengthen its position and mask its aggressive moves with massive information warfare. Even in the current face-off with India, it’s media has been portraying this as an aggression by India while also citing its current dispute with Nepal and even the fifty year old break-up of Pakistan to bolster its claims. China has also always adopted a policy of bilateral dealings in its foreign policy so as to isolate and pressurize, or bully in other words, individual nations with its economic and military might while brazenly flouting international law. The example of China rejecting the ruling of 2016 in favor of Philippines over the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by the Permanent Court of Arbitration established under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), and its subsequent actions, are clear examples of how China behaves with weaker neighbors in disputes.
It is also very clear, and unfortunate, that all the agreements and mechanisms put in place to bilaterally resolve the boundary dispute with China since 1993 have failed despite decades of patient and peaceful attempts by India to resolve this issue, once for all, so that both countries could move on and focus on more important issues of economic growth and poverty alleviation instead of tying up huge resources in the military. Even the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism, set in place after PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, has been made ineffective by China expanding its agenda beyond the border dispute to the strategic relationship between the two countries and by first demanding transfer of the Tawang tract to China, for “political” reasons. 14 For more details as well recommendations on these issues, please see “Beijing reaches out to bridge differences: Co-Operation on Chinese terms?” 15 in the India- China Chronicle, September-October 2019 issue. Viewed from any angle, it is evident that China would not like to settle the boundary issue with India and would like to see this issue continue to bother India as a festering sore to keep India pre-occupied and contained in South Asia. For China, at least in the foreseeable future, it appears that it does not make any political, military or economic sense to lower the tension on the borders with India while it continues to increase its economic and military might to currently challenge the US in the Indo-Pacific and, later on the global stage, as the major superpower, which incidentally concurrently neutralizes India.
As part of its information warfare strategy, China also attempts to sow seeds of misinformation and dissension within the opposing country through all possible means. This can be seen in its tirades against every country in times of disputes, with the current accusations even against America on the Corona virus pandemic as the most recent example. Unfortunately, in our democratic system, there are always elements within the country, disgruntled or otherwise motivated, amenable to the Chinese propaganda, which tend to weaken the stand of the ruling dispensation. In the current face-off, by using the words “differences in perceptions on the LAC”, we also seem to be playing in the hands of the Chinese that there is a dispute on the LAC even in areas where there has been no dispute for decades now with our patrols regularly going up to the LAC, as in Galwan valley and Finger 8 of Pangong Tso. Unfortunately also, there is a view amongst national security experts that India has, so far, been following an appeasement policy towards China that just will not work. 16 As stated earlier, soothing statements on co-operation and peaceful bilateral resolution of the disputes would continue to be made by China to lull us into a sense of complacency.
Due to these reasons, while taking note of all the Chinese moves to nibble away at our territory, it is not only important to take a firm stand against Chinese actions but to pre-empt any weakness in the response by evolving a political consensus on the issue in advance. Certainly, while India may not match up to China militarily at this time for a full-scale conventional war, it has enough capability to give it a good fight and a bloody nose. It is felt that even China cannot afford a major skirmish, much less an all out war with India, in the current geo-political situation. It is also important to note that acquiescence to a bully’s demands, even partially, only whets the bully’s appetite for more at a time and place of his choosing. Thus, in view of all the fruitless talks and mechanisms for resolution of disputes between India and China, it would be important for us to chalk out a clear policy on how to deal with such aggression now, and in future, perhaps with a different approach since the existing mechanisms and approach just have not worked.
So, the issue comes down what India should be doing to negate the Chinese designs in the short as well as long-term. First of all, it needs to be realized that the current face-off is unlikely to be resolved in a hurry unless we cave in to the Chinese demands. Having invested a large effort in the current aggression, the Chinese can hardly be expected to walk away without extracting some concessions. Even their demands are unlikely to come forth in clear terms in a hurry. As the aggressor in possession of our territory, possession being ninth tenth of the law, the Chinese are unlikely to be in a hurry even to put forward their demands. In Doka La or Doklam, we were very clear that we didn’t want the Chinese to build a road in the area that was clearly Bhutan’s. Even with this clarity, it took 73 days to resolve the issue and for the Chinese to agree not to build the road. In the bargain, however, there have been some reports that, soon after the agreement, the Chinese built every other facility and infrastructure in most of Doklam plateau to strengthen their position in any future face-off in the same area while diplomatically working to get Bhutan to dissociate from the trilateral problem and make it a bilateral issue between China and Bhutan.
In view of the above, we can expect this face-off and negotiations to continue for quite some time and should be prepared for the long haul with a possibility of some localized skirmishes if the talks don’t go well. We can also expect that, in the parleys currently underway on both the diplomatic and military channels, in keeping with their culture and approach, the Chinese demands would be couched and shrouded in diplomatese without playing their hand, mainly to assess the Indian resolve and response to evaluate how far we would be willing to concede on their various “grievances” against us. Fortunately, both the Defence and Home Ministers have made unambiguous statements that India would not cede an inch of Indian Territory across the LAC or compromise on national interest. As of now, regular military parleys at the level of Generals are underway but it is considered unlikely that these would resolve the issue to our complete satisfaction in a hurry.
In the short-term, it is undeniable that we need to stand firm against such creeping encroachments and bullying. Concurrently, we should build up our forces adequately in the areas of the face-off and around to ensure that there is no outflanking move by the Chinese behind our lines keeping in view reports that Chinese troops have been practicing such outflanking moves by night in a recent exercise in the area. We should also be ready to play tit for tat at an opportune moment in areas where we are more advantageously placed to show the Chinese not only our resolve but to convey the message that two can play the same game. This could include some moves along the maritime front in the Indian Ocean. Fortunately, we have adequate forces for deterrence, if not an all-out war, and our lines of communications in the areas of the face-off, as also on in the Indian Ocean, are shorter and we can logistically maintain a firm posture in these areas better for a longer time. In this effort, we need to remember that China is also under increasing pressure in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea, with the US moving against China on many fronts and China cannot afford to remove a large force from its eastern front.
India, thus, must stand fast against regular Chinese attempts at salami slicing and be prepared for the long haul in the current standoff. In the long-term, it should seriously pursue the steps on political, economic, diplomatic and military fronts outlined in the earlier article referred above. The military front needs to be reemphasized since China only understands power and would continue to bully us unless we build up adequate deterrence in the window of the decade ahead. With China’s emphasis on unrestricted war and the recent missives of President Xi’s to his military, 17 and the reports of increased Chinese activity and videos of large-scale maneuvers immediately after the so-called positive talks at Lt Gen level of June 06, 18 we must also take all proactive measures including on the cyber and information war fronts since such non-contact attacks can also be expected to increase in intensity with time. The Chinese moves, by themselves, may be just posturing and attempts at intimidation, as also seen earlier with reminders of 1962 during the Doklam standoff. However, we cannot afford to take any such moves lightly.
Lastly, we may also consider opening up a new front by taking the border dispute with China to an international forum, like the International Court of Justice, at an opportune moment in the future if China continues to remain belligerent and all attempts at bilateral settlement of the border prove futile. Surely, our claim to the entire territory of Ladakh is strong. Otherwise, we wouldn’t be trying to defend the indefensible as a non-hegemonic power. International diplomatic support is also more likely now that the international community seems to better understand our predicament vis-à-vis an aggressive and belligerent China, as evidenced by the recent statements of Alice Wells from the US State Department. There is already a view that we should take the recent Indo-Nepal border issue to the ICJ. 19 While we may not want to do that due to our historic ties with Nepal and make attempts to resolve the issue at the diplomatic and political levels, there is no assurance that Nepal would be averse to start such litigation.
Merely the start of an international litigation can be expected to put China under pressure on one more issue whatever be their attitude towards abiding by the law or ruling of international bodies. While there may be some concerns that such a move may also internationalize the accession of the entire state of JK, which is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, it is felt that the issue can legally be separated, particularly after the formation of Ladakh as a union territory. Even if Pakistan attempts to involve itself in this dispute, we already have an irrefutable legal basis on that issue through the instrument of accession, Pakistan’s aggression and it’s failure to abide by the pre-condition in the UN resolution of 1949 to vacate occupied areas before initiating any other steps, apart from the Simla agreement stipulating a purely bilateral resolution of our disputes. With China, we do not have such a commitment.
In any event, we may have no recourse but to take the water dispute to an international body someday in view of the reports now emerging that China may have started obstructing the flow of water in to the Galwan River and may do so with other rivers too thus signaling weaponization of China’s upper riparian rights. 20 It is also felt that an international ruling cannot leave us in any state worse than the current one on the boundary issue China, while also considering regular incursions and disputes with an increasingly aggressive and hostile neighbor. In conclusion, it needs to be made abundantly clear to China that the dragon and the elephant can only dance together if the dragon can learn to stop spewing fire at regular intervals, which it is inclined to do by its very nature.
Published in
Defence and Diplomacy, pp.1-12.
or
1 “Face Offs-The Matrix Ahead”, Shankar PR, Lt Gen, available at
https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/05/face-offs-matrix-ahead-by-lt-gen-
pr.html?m=1 (Accessed May 29, 2020), “A Military Analysis of the Sino-Indian
Border Clashes”, Reynolds N & Kaushal S at https://rusi.org/commentary/military-
analysis-sino%E2%80%93indian-border-clashes (Accessed June 04, 2020) and
“China has definitely crossed India’s Lakshman rekha but it won’t lead to 1962
again”, Menon P, Lt Gen, at https://theprint.in/opinion/china-has-definitely-
crossed-indias-lakshman-rekha-but-it-wont-lead-to-1962-again/431490/
(Accessed May 30, 2020).
2 “India’s fingers have come under the Chinese boots. Denial won’t help”, Panag HS,
Lt Gen at https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-fingers-have-come-under-chinese-
boots-denial-wont-help-us/435145/ (Accessed June 06, 2020).
3 “Abhijit Iyer-Mitra Vs Ajai Shukla: Big Border Face-Off over Ladakh Standoff, India
Today Newstrack available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maHCZZPLBNA
(Accessed June 08, 2020).
4 Pandit, Rajat “Ball set rolling, but Ladakh de-escalation may take time”, Times
Nation, The Times of India, June 08, 2020, p. 5.
5 Shankar PR, Op.Cit.
6 The last Sikkim Stand-Off: When India gave China a bloody nose in 1967, Krishnan
Ananth, The Hindu, June 30, 2017 available at
https://www.indiatoday.in/world/asia/story/india-china-stand-off-sikkim-stand-
off-tulung-la-nathu-la-pass-doklam-plateau-1021579-2017-06-30 (Accessed May
28, 2020).
7 For this and more, see “What’s Behind Chinese Intrusions”, Bagchi Indrani, The
Times of India, June 04, 2020, p. 8.
8 For more details on China’s relations and support to Pakistan, please see Shalini
Chawla, China-Pakistan Strategic Nexus-Implications for India in Essays on China,
2012, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Ed, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd New Delhi,
Chapter 5, pp. 153-184.
9 For a detailed analysis of India’s policies and its relations with China, see Kanwal
Sibal, India-China Relations: Problems and Prospects, Air Power Journal Vol. 7 No. 3,
Monsoon 2012 (July-September), pp. 1-26 and Jasjit Singh, Essays on China, 2012,
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Ed, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd New Delhi, Chapter
1: China’s India War: Revisiting the Key Elements.
10 Jasjit Singh, Op.Cit. p. 2.
11 Ibid, p.11.
12 “Old Chinese maps show Aksai Chin as a part of Ladakh”, India Today report
available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/aksai-chin-ladakh-old-chinese-
maps-india-china-border-dispute-1683315-2020-05-29?ref=taboola (Accessed May
30, 2020).
13 Jasjit Singh, Op.Cit. pp. 5-7.
14 Kanwal Sibal, Op.Cit. p. 4.
15 Masand, Harish, Air Marshal, “Beijing Reaches Out to Bridge Differences: Co-
operation on Chinese Terms”, India-China Chronicle, September-October 2019
Issue, pp. 36-41 available at http://www.icec-council.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/ICC-Sept-Oct-2019-book.pdf.
16 “India’s Appeasement Policy begins to Unravel”, Chellaney, Brahma, Japan Times,
June 08, 2020 available at
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/06/08/commentary/world-
commentary/indias-appeasement-policy-toward-china-unravels/#.Xt4lhCPytbU
(Accessed June 08, 2020).
17 “Chinese President Xi Jinping meets PLA, urges battle preparedness”, Krishnan
Ananth, The Hindu May 26, 2020 available at
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinese-president-xi-jinping-
meets-pla-urges-battle-preparedness/article31680691.ece?homepage=true
(Accessed May 30, 2020).
18 “China Flexes its Muscle”, WION TV news, June 08, 2020. Also see “Ball set rolling–
-”, and “Day after talks, MEA says India and China will resolve issue peacefully”,
Times of India, June 08, 2020, Op. Cit. p. 5.
19 Bagchi, Op.Cit.
20 “Chinese intrusion into Galwan——-”, Iyer-Mitra Abhijit, available at
https://theprint.in/opinion/chinese-intrusion-in-galwan-lasted-for-two-weeks-
before-it-was-cleared-by-indian-troops/428658/ (Accessed June 05, 2020).