Consultative Strategizing: A Prerequisite For Integration

It is indisputable that the Indian military continues to work in silos, like all governmental agencies in India, and a need was rightly felt and directions issued by PM Modi to bring about jointness, leaving the task to the first CDS of India. It is also indisputable that the aim is to bring about synergy in operations while economizing through elimination of duplication and wasteful practices/processes. At the outset, it also needs to be clearly stated that, contrary to the recent media reports, debates and some opinions, the Air Force is not playing the ‘dog in the manger’ and resisting formation of theatre/functional commands. With 40 years in uniform, as I understand the doctrine and philosophy of the IAF, it is as keen to bring in the requisite reforms to improve the war-fighting capabilities of the Indian military as a whole, while economizing.

The statement that the IAF wants to fight its own private war thus comes from people who do not understand the nuances and capabilities of air power and lack the expertise in its effectively utilization. In the current formulation of theatres, the objections from the air force have essentially been due to air power being seen as an adjunct to the two surface forces, the Army and the Navy, and being divided into penny packets which would seriously degrade the effectiveness of air operations in any future conflict or contingency. Better that such objections and dissenting opinions come now before the structure is formalized than once it is set in stone and the use of air power is found to be sub-optimal under the military ethos of “an order is an order”. Remember, in war there is no prize for the runner-up. The nation would then end up paying a heavy price with the air force carrying the burden and blame for the failures.

If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then it is essential to first define the political objectives flowing into a national security strategy before any effective use of force can be truly contemplated. The failures of the mightiest militaries in Vietnam, Afghanistan and even our own misadventure in Sri Lanka bear testimony to the lack of clear political objectives and appropriate military strategies. It is, therefore, unfortunate that even after almost 75 years since independence, India still does not have a clearly articulated national security strategy. Only such a strategy can define the types of contingencies the military is expected to address, leading to appropriate military strategies, doctrines and required capabilities. That would define the structures required for conduct of synergized operations with the requisite communications and training requirements. Concurrently, such an intellectual exercise would identify duplication, wasteful resources and practices. This is what the CDS should have been pursuing before first freezing the structure and then trying to glue the pieces together or hammer square pegs in round holes.

As argued elsewhere earlier, such an exercise may well result in identifying air power as the lead element, particularly since the Indian political aim, even in the foreseeable future, is unlikely to be occupation of new territories. A large manpower-intensive army with unusable armor formations would then also come into focus. Even the proposed air defence command conflicts with the domain commands in seamless employment of air power. It is due to such an intellectual exercise that the IAF does not wish to see its limited resources frittered away in fighting frontal defensive battles by a land force commander with little expertise in employment of air power who fails to realize that offensive air power is best not seen, busy keeping the enemy air force pinned down elsewhere while giving own surface forces the freedom to maneuver and operate with impunity, as shown in 1971.

Historically, the Army has always kept the air force out of the information loop at the cost of joint planning and synergy in operations. The charge that the air force joined the party late during Kargil is also totally baseless and shows a lack of knowledge of events and a failure to learn from historical facts. Recorded facts clearly prove that the IAF started conducting reconnaissance missions on May 10 as soon as the Army just made a bland request for attack helicopters, something the Army did not do before launching foot patrols which were mostly ambushed with unnecessary casualties. Use of offensive air power close to the LoC also required that the political leadership be kept informed due to possibilities of escalation, something that the Army was unwilling to do. Even the COAS initially threatened to go it alone on his return from his visit abroad. As for silos, the COAS himself admitted later that information was not shared even between the DGMO and DGMI within Army HQ, much less with the air force. All this was despite the fact that the Defence Program post-1962 was based on the assumption that China posed the major threat and that the IAF be made capable of assuming some of the Army’s deterrence capability.

Seen in this light, the Chinese incursion into Eastern Ladakh last year is reminiscent of Kargil in 1999. While the response has been swift, it is evident that a clear intent to use combat air power, as against 1962, has significantly contributed in deterring China. However, such intent and a joint strategy would have been forcefully signaled by the presence of air force representatives in the ongoing negotiations to restore status quo ante. The continuing build-up of the infrastructure for the PLAAF in Tibet further emphasizes the need for an air-land strategy with air power as the lead element to deter or defeat the Chinese designs at coercion.

Finally, theatre or any lower structure requires an institutionalized higher defence organization, which have been sadly missing since the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) became defunct in the 1950s leading to little regular dialogue between the political and military leadership, except in crises resulting in knee-jerk responses. This led to a remark from a scholar-warrior that, “it is ironic that the Cabinet has an Accommodation Committee but not a Defence Committee”. In the current proposal, it appears that the CDS, as the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, would also exercise operational control of the theatre/functional commands, a move that is unlikely to be palatable to the politico-bureaucratic leadership and which has, perhaps, called for further deliberations.

Prudence demands that instead of ramming down such structures without adequate deliberations/discussions with all stakeholders, we first evolve appropriate military strategies in a nuclear backdrop in concert with the political objectives. Thereafter, joint planning and training for all foreseen contingencies, with war-gaming, would automatically indicate the required structures with suitable Command, Control and Communications. Unfortunately, as this article was being prepared for print, the CDS on Friday derailed the current consultative deliberations on theaterization by making an ill- conceived and insensitive statement that ‘the air force must remember that it is a supporting arm like artillery and engineers’. This reconfirms that the Army leadership has little understanding of air power, apart from military history, and is ill equipped to effectively utilize the air forces placed under their proposed land-centric commands.

Published in the Hindu Editorial as “The problem now on military synergy plan” on
Monday, 05 July 2021.