Beijing reaches out to bridge differences co-operation on Chinese terms?
The Sunday Hindustan Times of July 21, 2019 reported that “Ahead of external affairs minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Beijing next month to prepare the grounds for the second bilateral summit (between PM Modi and President Xi Jinping on October 11), China’s new envoy (Sun Weidong) has said the two sides should narrow their differences and step up cooperation on the world stage”. The statement, coming as it is at a time of heightened tensions over the trade dispute between the US and China as also US concerns over the increased militarization of South China Sea, is something to be expected. Indeed, ever since the US renamed the Asia-Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific and also renamed its Pacific Command, based at Hawaii, as the Indo-Pacific Command highlighting the importance of India in its efforts to contain or manage the uncomfortable rise of China and its growing assertiveness in this region, China has been attempting its own balancing act to wean India away from the US-led camp. As a matter of fact, the recent designation of India as a major non-NATO ally may have added further impetus to China’s efforts in this regard.
Ambassador-designate Sun Weidong was expected in Delhi on July 21 and, in the Friday’s brief to a select group of Indian journalists, just prior to his departure from Beijing, added that the two sides have to do more than just managing differences and take more initiative in shaping the relationship while also highlighting that “our shared interests far outweigh our differences”. There is no denying that China and India have many possible areas of cooperation for mutual benefit. Unfortunately, these are under an overhang of several unresolved differences which Beijing has done little to resolve. From India’s perspective, the two most important of these differences have been the unresolved border issue and the rising trade deficit, which currently stands at $ 58 billion, higher than India’s defense budget. Admittedly, the unsettled border and frequent incursions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with progressively increasing claims are the most bothersome for India in its security calculus and keep it tied down in a two front scenario. This may soon become a three front problem for India.
Thus, while China continues its diplomatic overtures to woo India through strengthening the “Wuhan Spirit” and strategic cooperation on the world stage to uphold multilateralism and economic globalization, suspicions abound on China’s true intent, particularly when viewed in a historical perspective. Many strategic experts have already termed the “Wuhan Spirit” as one-sided with China acting unilaterally in its own interests in keeping with its strategic ambitions while India has been muted in its protestations when its national interests are blatantly ignored or opposed.
Historically, the fact remains that while China has settled its boundary with all of its South Asian neighbors based on the watershed principle and the McMahon line, as also with others with minor adjustments, it has refused to do so with India. China continues to occupy a large chunk of the state of J & K in the Aksai Chin and Ladakh areas, most of it occupied even before the humiliating war of 1962, while progressively staking a claim to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in the East, as also some other smaller areas in the North, to keep India off- guard and under threat while also improving its bargaining position. China’s use of its all-weather ally and proxy, Pakistan, in this effort cannot also be ignored. Being in occupation and as a stronger military power, China has shown little serious intent to resolve the boundary issue with India.1 As a matter of fact, the Chinese have been consistent only in continuously changing their stance and claims on the boundary issue. The Chinese have also been adept at slow and progressive occupation of claimed territory in what even the first prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, as early as in the 1950s, referred to as China’s concept of “mobile frontiers”.2 Later, this has also been termed the “salami slicing” strategy, evident recently even in South China Sea.
China has invested heavily in the economic corridor through Pak occupied Kashmir (PoK), better known as the CPEC under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in its strategic reach into the Arabian Sea through development of Gwadar as a dual purpose port, both for trade and, in the long-term as a naval facility to support its military activities in the larger strategic aim of encircling India with its string of pearls as also to bypass the Malacca straits choke point. Through this economic corridor, it also aims to exploit the mineral wealth of Balochistan while pushing in its citizens and troops into PoK and the rest of Pakistan in the garb of developing and securing this corridor. It is natural to presume that China would not invest so heavily in such a project in a so-called disputed area, actually in illegal occupation of Pakistan despite the accession of the state to India on 26 October 1947, unless it intended to defend its investment and interests in this area politically, diplomatically and, if required, militarily. The military dimensions of this investment have already been confirmed by the presence of 3-4000 Chinese troops in PoK as early as 2012-13. This adds another dimension to India’s efforts to reclaim the occupied portions of the state of J & K.
Senior Indian and Chinese Military Officials at the Kibithu-Damai border personnel meeting (BPM) held in January 2019
Further, even while accepting that the state of J & K is under dispute, China has had no qualms in not just investing in PoK for the economic corridor but has already occupied a large portion of land in Shaksgam valley of PoK, illegally ceded to it by Pakistan in 1963. While accepting the cession of this portion of land in the course of settling the boundary between Sinkiang and the state of J & K, China did agree that the final status of this area would be determined based on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and the sovereign authority emerging over this boundary. Keeping its forays into such disputed territory, China’s brazen and duplicitous approach in such matters is also evident from its objections to India’s cooperation in developing oil fields with Vietnam in the South China Sea and funding of development projects in Arunachal Pradesh, amongst many such actions against any activity in the so-called disputed areas.
China also developed Pakistan as a convenient proxy, almost as if it was following the Kautilyan strategy on middle kingdoms, to keep India in check even within South Asia from the late 1950s and continues to support it politically, diplomatically, economically as well as militarily, the last including clandestine but well-known support and assistance towards Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs.3 China’s prolonged reluctance to label Masood Azhar as a global terrorist and finally its recent acquiescence to sustained political and diplomatic pressure in this matter is well known. It’s continued resistance to India’s entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as also in the UN security Council can also be taken as confirmation of its strategic objective of keeping India from rising on the global stage despite exhortations of strategic cooperation with India as the two major Asian powers. China also continues to invest economically and politically even in other nations in India’s immediate neighborhood while fomenting anti-India sentiments to keep it hemmed in within the region to thwart India’s rightful place as a regional power.
Without doubt, India’s problems with China started with the Maoist takeover of Tibet with expansionist ambitions and India’s failure to recognize the security implications of this move and take appropriate political, diplomatic and military measures at that time. Since the Chinese had utilized the old trade routes through Aksai Chin from Sinkiang for the so-called “liberation” of Tibet from the West, India should have realized that China was unlikely to abide by the existing boundaries and taken some measures to establish its administrative and military presence in the remote and inhospitable areas of J & K at that time itself instead of taking the assurances of Premier Zhou Enlai at face value and later trying to adopt a forward policy in the area without the wherewithal to maintain these positions when the Chinese had already built a road, consolidated their position in Aksai Chin and then laid a claim to more area. “India also made a crucial mistake in signing the 1954 Trade Agreement with the Tibet region of China that accepted, in effect, China’s sovereignty over Tibet, without linking this vital concession to either a settlement of the boundary with Tibet or at least an agreement on the framework of a settlement. India should have anticipated that sooner or later, China would extend its physical control up to the geographical frontiers of Tibet as it perceived them or as they suited its strategic needs.’ 4
Without going into too many details here due to constraints of space in this article, which are in any case available in the references cited herein, it needs to be highlighted that, as early as April 1960, it was decided between PM Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai that both sides would prepare an official report with evidence on the boundary issue from both sides. Later, three leading American Scholars carried out a detailed study of the evidence in the above Officials’ Report and came to the unequivocal conclusion that “the case the Chinese presented was a shoddy piece of work, betraying–if only to those in a position to consult the sources cited—a fundamental contempt for evidence” in support of its claims and later aggression. 5 Even as late as 1959, Zhou Enlai had stated in a letter that the 1956 map, published by China, which depicted the eastern boundary of Ladakh with Tibet in conformity with the Indian position, that it “correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector”.6
Despite such admissions, the Chinese have kept changing their stance and position on the boundary issue, laying claims to new and increased areas making all efforts at peacefully settling the boundary fruitless and frustrating. Even the Special Representatives (SRs) mechanism, set in place after PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, has been made ineffective by China expanding its agenda beyond the border dispute to the strategic relationship between the two countries by demanding transfer of the Tawang tract to China for “political” reasons.7 In view of the historical reluctance of China to settle the crucial boundary issue with India, it is difficult to see the Chinese ever “narrowing down the differences” and making any meaningful efforts to improve bilateral relations with India based on mutual respect and trust so that the two countries can continue to progress in a peaceful environment. As a matter of fact, China continues to make politically insensitive and unacceptable statements, as again exemplified by the recent one on July 31, 2019 by its foreign ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, on the need for third party mediation on the Kashmir issue, to keep India off-balance. For China, at least in the foreseeable future, it appears that it does not make any political, military or economic sense to lower the tension on the borders with India while it continues to increase its economic and military might to currently challenge the US in the Indo-Pacific and later on the global stage as the major superpower, which incidentally concurrently neutralizes India.
At the same time, it may currently not be in India’s interest to challenge China directly, at least militarily, while it is developing its own economy and playing catch-up. Till India is in a reasonably comfortable position economically and has a credible deterrence militarily, it would, perhaps, be wise to play the same game politically and diplomatically and extract as many concessions and agreements it can, making deft use of the prevailing geo-political situation and its geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps, India has just a decade or so to build its economy and the military to a comfortable level to deter China while China remains pre-occupied with issues like Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Uighur unrest in Sinkiang, pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and even the Dalai lama problem for its hold on Tibet.
Towards such deterrence, India also needs to pursue its “Act East” policy more actively and reach a cooperative understanding with other nations in the Indo-Pacific who have similar concerns on China’s aggressive moves in the area but cannot alone put a check on China’s salami slicing strategy. Existing maritime cooperation and exercises with like-minded nations should complement renewed political and diplomatic efforts in this area. The US has already identified India as a key partner in its strategy to contain China’s militaristic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. However, under President Trump, the US does not seem to be following a coherent and consistent policy in its strategy with punitive tariffs and sanctions even against its military allies in Europe, Japan and South Korea, much less strategic partners like India. In view of these inconsistencies, India has, so far, wisely not overly banked on the US to deter, if not actually contain, China from its aggressive moves in India’s natural sphere of influence and interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Despite such minor irritants, the need for a stronger relationship with the US remains for both sides. Currently, the US may be more focused in its efforts to get a deal for an honorable pullout from Afghanistan, however unlikely, to show some foreign policy victories for President Trump’s reelection campaign. This may compel the US to make statements like the offer to mediate in Kashmir to placate Pakistan. As a mature democracy, India has rightly underplayed such an unwarranted statement looking at the long-term benefits of a stronger relationship towards an improved technological base, trade and overall economic health of the country apart from the diplomatic support on global issues. India, once again, has to tread a narrow and carefully chosen path in its relations with the US, at least the next presidential elections in 2020.
In the long-term, however, considering that in international politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies but only permanent interests, it may be appropriate to lay out a national security strategy along with the economic roadmap to build the requisite capability to be able hold our own in the area of interest. A clear national security strategy, with reforms in the higher defense management, would help synergize all national activities towards building the desired capabilities. All this needs to be achieved within the available window of the next decade before China consolidates its position in its claimed areas and starts looking at expansionist moves against individual nations in keeping with its policy of dealing bilaterally on disputes. India also needs to realize that, with growing presence of modernized and powerful maritime presence of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean and Chinese utterances on the Indian Ocean not being India’s lake, it may well become a three front problem for India in its security calculus.
Concurrently, India’s geo-strategically advantageous position in the Indian Ocean could also be fruitfully utilized in deterring China on the northern boundaries as also in its cooperative arrangements with other countries. As a growing economic and military power without any hegemonic ambitions, borne out by thousands of years of its history, India is already seen as a net security provider in the region. The current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has also re-emphasized this aspect by repeatedly vocalizing the Indian philosophical perspective of “vasudhaiva kutumbakam” (Sanskrit for “the world is but one family”) while describing the inextricable linking of nations by the seas, in terms of resources, trade and maritime security. Unfortunately, China does not appear to view the world in this manner with its romantic vision of its civilization. This may actually work in India’s favor in the long-term with an increasing number of nations realizing the ultimate objectives of Chinese aid towards their sovereignty and indebtedness. Even Pakistan may realize this some day, though, perhaps, too late.
At the same time, it has to be accepted that on the economic and trade issue, the answers lie mainly within ourselves. Towards these, India can only achieve its objectives by redoubling efforts to improve its indigenous industry and competitiveness while demanding equitable access to the Chinese market. A 5 trillion dollar economy is a great target but a lot more effort may be necessary, particularly in the fields of education skill-development, infrastructure, industrial regulation the judicial system for speedy resolution of disputes, investments and, finally, removal of corruption, to be able to grow at the desired pace and make our industry and services world-class. As the largest democracy with an improving investment environment and rule of law, it should also be possible to replace China as the preferred destination for investments, particularly in the coming decade when the Chinese economy is expected to somewhat slow down simultaneously with rising labor costs, growing internal unrest and trade imbalances.
In the end, the bottom line has always been the economy and India needs to make every effort in the area of economic development, which will automatically enable a stronger military to provide a credible deterrence for its security needs. While its undeniable that India would not be able to match China, either economically or militarily, in the foreseeable future, it is also a fact that India does not really need to match China since it has no hegemonic ambitions. All it needs is a credible military with adequate capability for deterrence to prevent any adventurous moves on its territorial integrity or economic interests while it focuses on nation building. While India builds such capabilities, it must stand firm in the interim on its interests, like it did in Nathu La in 1967 and, more recently, in 2017 at Doklam. Ambassador Weidong must also realize that cooperation is a two-way street based on mutual respect and trust without coercion, acquiescence or appeasement.
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1 For a detailed analysis of India’s policies and its relations with China, see Kanwal
Sibal, India-China Relations: Problems and Prospects, Air Power Journal Vol. 7 No. 3,
Monsoon 2012 (July-September), pp. 1-26 and Jasjit Singh, Essays on China, 2012,
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Ed, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd New Delhi, Chapter 1: China’s India War: Revisiting the Key Elements.
2 Jasjit Singh, p. 2.
3 For more details on China’s relations and support to Pakistan, please see Shalini
Chawla, China-Pakistan Strategic Nexus-Implications for India in Essays on China,
2012, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Ed, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd New Delhi,
Chapter 5, pp. 153-184.
4 Kanwal SIbal, p. 3.
5 Jasjit Singh, pp. 5-7.
6 Jasjit Singh, p. 11.
7 Kanwal SIbal, p. 4.