Book Review-1965-A Western Sunrise by Shiv Kunal Verma

Shiv Kunal Verma’s latest treatise on the 1965 Indo-Pak War in “1965: A Western Sunrise”, is perhaps the most comprehensive account of this War produced so far. Though it has been over 55 years since the War was fought, an official and authentic history of the War has been sadly conspicuous by it’s absence. While some accounts have been published earlier based on limited official information, Shiv Kunal’s account has ventured into areas that have not been touched earlier, or touched upon only in passing. The detailed accounts of the battles on the ground and in the air almost on a day to day basis, interspersed with personal recollections, makes for a book that is hard to put down. Unfortunately, with almost 500 pages in small print, no matter how hard I tried, I had to take breaks in between particularly with a eye on details and correlation of events along with references to the sources cited. Starting with the background and the causes leading to this conflict, along with the psyche of the personalities involved which cast some fresh light on the factors that led to their decisions, the book rolls on effortlessly to the outbreak of hostilities and the events as they unfolded. This is a work of painstaking research over a long time, as Kunal himself admits, with breaks from this pursuit in between due to other literary commitments. 

Following in the lines of his earlier work, “1962: The war that Wasn’t”, and relying on his research for that book in many places in this book too, Kunal does not hold back any punches when it comes to lapses in planning and execution, especially at the higher levels of direction and decisions, political as well as military, on both sides of the border. As Indians, we should take note of the message that comes out loud and clear in terms of the military direction of War at the higher levels which was sadly remiss with little detailed planning, lack of focus on hard and reliable intelligence and little emphasis on the logistics. Kunal also does not mince any words when he lays the responsibility for such lacunae clearly and largely on the shoulders of General JN Chaudhuri, the Chief of the Army Staff and his personality with a defensive mindset. That General ‘Mucchu’ Chaudhuri took this as a personal war with campaign planning that was not even shared with his immediate subordinates, much less the sister services, the Navy and the Air Force, has been said earlier in many previous accounts and does not come as surprise. Essentially due to this reason, there was little or no coordination between the three services, particularly the Army and the Air Force, and a great opportunity to fight synergistic battles on the entire western front and achieve a decisive victory was lost. Even after 1962, the lessons had clearly not been learnt and the use of air power and the coordinating structure required for its optimum use when in close proximity of own troops was neglected both by the Army as well as the Air Force. Also, due to the personality and approach of General Chaudhuri, it also comes out very clearly that even army formations were thrown into battle, as if moving pieces on a chessboard, with the commanders not even familiar with the terrain in front of them much less enemy dispositions leading to avoidable casualties. Poor and unreliable communications between units also led to frittering away the gains that were made against great odds apart from the failure to exploit opportunities opened through such gains with an aggressive mindset and some risk-taking. The adage ‘Nothing ventured, nothing gained’ comes to the fore repeatedly but sadly. Pakistani superiority in artillery and armour made the task of the heroic lower commanders and troops even more difficult, particularly with use of own armour in penny-packets.  Differences between commanders at higher levels as well as PSOs in Army HQ also added to the loss of effectiveness. It was fortunate for India  that the higher direction of War was almost as disjointed on the Pakistani side and India was spared of the ignominy of a deep armoured thrust with loss of major territory. 

Where Kunal stops, and I found it surprising knowing his trait of not holding back punches, was that he does not delve deep into the reasons why the Navy and the Air Force seemed unprepared for the War. Admittedly, there was some initial caution from the political leadership on escalating the conflict with use of the IAF and Navy. However, with the opening moves by Pakistan in the form of intrusions from 1964 onwards, the build-up to war in early 1965 and, finally, an attack on the border outposts in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 through Operation Desert Hawk, it is surprising that the military leadership did not fully prepare itself for the impending confrontation even after Prime Minister Shastri’s clear announcement that India would fight on a front of its choice as early as 28 April 1965 through a radio broadcast. Despite such clear indications of a conflict in the offing, it was surprising that the Navy and the Air Force did not prepare themselves adequately for any eventuality in a pro-active manner with their own plans, even if General Chaudhuri was not willing to share his thoughts and plans in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Even after the use of the Air Force on the 1st of September, albeit initially with obsolescent Vampires, three of which were shot down, it is inexplicable why the IAF still seemed unprepared on the 6th when the pre-emotive strikes were launched by the PAF with major losses of aircraft the ground. Despite such losses on the 6th, surprisingly the IAF lost more aircraft on the ground the next day in the East at Kalaikunda to a lone squadron of PAF Sabres operating from Tezgaon in Dacca. Such losses on the ground, ascribed to command failure at the tactical level in dispersal of aircraft though not fatal to its later efforts, cost the IAF more than half its total losses for the War. From the accounts of the air engagements where the puny Gnat earned the sobriquet of the Sabre-Slayer, it also sadly emerges that the IAF had not developed suitable air combat or attack tactics for the jet age, or disseminated these to fighting units, despite having pilots who had been trained as Fighter Leaders in the UK, many having flown Sabres in the US and having attended the training with the USAF and RAF during Exercise Shiksha after the 1962 debacle. Due to this lacuna, many wingmen remained under-utilized in air combat situation and some were shot down while trying to stick to their leaders. This lacuna would have come out clearly if Kunal had included the air combat diagrams of each major engagement that he otherwise described in such great detail, which would have also facilitated the identification of mistakes made even in highly successful engagements, beneficial to future generations. Modified attack patterns and tactics could also have reduced losses to anti-aircraft fire particularly to small arms fire.Once again, fortunately for India, the mindset in this area of Army-Air cooperation was no better in the Pakistani GHQ, both armies having read the same manuals and, particularly, the senior leadership having been trained quite similarly.                 

Though Kunal does not delve much on this issue, it needs to be highlighted that the Navy remained largely out of the War due to strange and obviously unopposed political directions. The question still remains as to why the Navy failed to defer the routine maintenance of its sole aircraft carrier, Vikrant, to retain its punch for the impending war. Once again, apparently due to a defensive mindset, the Navy suffered the loss of a frigate and the ignominy of the Pakistani attack on Dwarka and was unable to counter the Pakistani Navy’s aggressive forays.

While the narration in the book is detailed and gripping, I also feel a small sketch or map of the battlefield with disposition and move of forces on both sides would have made the going easier and less difficult in understanding each thrust and parry. Minor editorial and factual errors also tend to confuse the reader. Just as an example, for an armoured squadron, the rank of Squadron Leader for Avinash Khanna on Page 318 seems to have slipped by as has 75,000 Sq Km for Shaksgam Valley on Page 28. The MiG-21 on Page 232 and the F-86 Sabre on Page 409 and later are indicated to be carrying 30 mm cannons though, in fact, the MiG-21 had a 23 mm gun and the the F-86 had 0.5 inch machine guns. Similarly, the Hunter version in 1965 only carried 8xT-10 rockets and did not cruise at 580 Kts as indicated at Page 419. I would recommend the book as a must read for all students of military history.